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1. INTRODUCTION

There is more interrelation between statutory and constitutional law as a source
of substantive antidiscrimination protections than is generally acknowledged.
Although the Supreme Court's recent decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co.' purports to be a narrow procedural ruling regarding the start of the
statutory limitations period for Title VII claims,2 at its core, the decision turns on
a cramped and narrow understanding of what it means to discriminate on the basis
of sex. This understanding has much broader implications for sex equality law than
the procedural hurdles the decision presents for victims of pay discrimination
pursuing Title VII claims. By choosing the most narrow, limiting conception of
discrimination, the Court undermines the potential for statutory law to fill in the

* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. Many thanks to the editors of the South CarolinaLaw

Review for organizing this symposium. Many thanks also to Matthew Fornataro for research assistance
on this Article.
1. 127 S.Ct. 2162 (2007).
2. Id.at 2177.
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details of the Constitution's broad provisions for equal protection and to add
meaningful content to the promise of equal citizenship.
My contribution to this symposium will consider three aspects in which the
Court's recent decision in Ledbetter undermines the Constitution's promise of equal
protection. First, by adopting a narrow and restrictive conception of what
constitutes discrimination, the Court further dilutes the strength of statutory
antidiscrimination law, which has been the primary source of sex equality
guarantees in our modern law. Second, by further narrowing the category of acts
that constitute unlawful discrimination, the Court continues its trajectory of leaving
Congress less room to legislate under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Finally, by contributing to a legal culture that understands discrimination narrowly,
the Court's decision adds to the legal narratives that make it difficult to perceive
discrimination when it happens. If discrimination occurs only when an identifiable
actor consciously and overtly acts out of animus against women, then what might
otherwise seem like discrimination must really be something else. An overly narrow
definition of discrimination legitimizes status quo inequalities that are not
attributable to such conduct, promoting the perception that choice, ability, or some
undiscovered factor must be responsible for whatever inequality remains. For these
reasons, I view Ledbetter as a decision that significantly undercuts the
Constitution's promise of equal protection of the law, despite its statutory and
procedural origins.
II.

THE IMPORTANCE OF STATUTORY LAW IN SECURING EQUAL PROTECTION OF
THE LAW: "SUPER-STATUTES"

AS QUASI-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE
DISAPPOINTINGLY HOLLOW SEX EQUALITY NoRMs IN LEDBETTER

For some time now, the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection, at least
insofar as it is enforced by courts, has been overshadowed by statutory protections
against discrimination. The major federal statutes proscribing discrimination based
on sex, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' (Title VII), the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act4 (PDA), Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972' (Title
IX), the Equal Pay Act6 (EPA), and the Fair Housing Act,7 have done much more
to secure sex equality in recent decades than the Constitution's Equal Protection
Clause, at least as the Clause has been judicially enforced against state actors. This
is partially due to the way courts have interpreted the Constitution's Equal
Protection Clause, as discussed below, and partially due to the differences between
the institutional sources of statutory and constitutional equality guarantees. Unlike
the Court's interpretation of the Constitution, the Court's interpretation of statutes
results in a stronger connection to a majoritarian mandate because statutes stem
from the mobilization of popular majorities that support codifying legal protections.
Because of the importance of statutory law in adding content to the Constitution's
broad promise of equal protection, this symposium on the Roberts Court and equal

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17 (2000).
Id. § 2000e(k).
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000).
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000).
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 3619 (2000).
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protection properly devotes attention to the implications of the Court's recent
Ledbetter ruling and its interpretation of pay discrimination under Title VII.
A.

Sex DiscriminationStatutes as Adding Content to ConstitutionalNorms of
Equal Protection
1.

The Emptiness of ConstitutionalSex Equality Rights

The Constitution itself encompasses only very narrow sex equality guarantees,
at least insofar as it creates substantive rights that are judicially enforceable against
state actors. The Constitution's guarantee of equal protection has been severely
constrained by numerous bedrock precedents embodied in constitutional law:
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,' adopting a strict intent
requirement for challenging facially neutral practices with a discriminatory effect; 9
Geduldig v. Aiello, ° refusing to regard discrimination based on pregnancy as sex
discrimination;" and a number of precedents, beginning with the Civil Rights
Cases 2 and culminating in the United States v. Morrison" decision, that have
adopted a strict state action requirement and that have defined state action very
narrowly.

4

As a result of these limiting doctrines, the Constitution's equal protection
promise of sex equality has been practically limited to those few instances where
sex discrimination is enforced by a state actor through a sex-based facial
classification" that cannot be plausibly defended on the basis of "real" differences
between the sexes.'6 With few exceptions, the most meaningful substantive
constraints on sex equality have come from antidiscrimination statutes and not
directly from judicial interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.

8. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
9. Id. at 279.
10. 417 U.S. 484 (1974), supersededby statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000)).
11. Aiello, 417 U.S. at 497.
12. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
13. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
14. Id. at619 27.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541, 557 (1996) (finding that Virginia
violated women's right to equal protection by not providing them with a comparable education to that
received by men at the Virginia Military Institute).
16. See, e.g., Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001) (upholding the constitutionality of an
immigration statute that made proof of citizenship more difficult for children whose fathers, rather than
mothers, were United States citizens, stating that the failure to note the biological differences between
men and women in the birth process would render the Equal Protection Clause "superficial"); Rostker
v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 78 79 (1981) (finding that restrictions placed on women regarding combat
justified a federal act that only required men to register for the draft); Michael M. v. Superior Court of
Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 471, 476 (1981) (finding that statutory rape imposing criminal liability
on only males was justified because ofthe different risks and consequences men and women experience
as a result of sexual intercourse).
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Sex DiscriminationStatutes as "Super-Statutes"

Given the Court's longstanding rejection of a more vibrant and far-reaching
constitutional guarantee of equality, statutory law has long held the most promise
for furthering sex equality. In a recent article, Professor William Eskridge explains
that this is true for most of our fundamental understandings of the basic legal rules
and commitments that structure our civil society. 17 He argues that for institutional
reasons, the Court does not give detailed substantive content to major normative
constitutional guarantees like sex equality. 8 Instead, it is necessary to look to
"super-statutes,"such as Title VII, the PDA, and Title IX, that embody a broad
normative proposition. 19 To qualify as a super-statute, a statute must meet three
criteria: (1) it "seeks to establish a new normative or institutional framework for
state policy;" (2) it "'stick[s]' in the public culture," and (3) the statute "and its
institutional or normative principles have a broad effect on the law.' Under this
formulation, Title VII, along with other major federal sex discrimination statutes
like the PDA, Title IX, and the EPA, are clearly super-statutes. Professor Eskridge
argues that such statutes play an important role in defining the contours of our
constitutional commitments-' and that judges "should interpret [them] liberally to
carry out their great public purposes. 22 Because these statutes are a result of the
democratic process, judges should not interpret them under the same institutional
constraints that produce underenforced constitutional norms ;23rather, judges should
recognize the full content and scope of these statutes, with special attentiveness to
agency interpretations, because these agencies are also more politically
accountable.24 Professor Eskridge views this model of statutory supplementation,
the PDA Model, 2 as more vibrant than the Marbury Model26 for American
Constitutionalism, 2 7 in which judicial constitutional interpretation can only be
overridden through the process of constitutional amendment.28
Under the PDA Model, the Ledbetterdecision is a significant setback for Title
VII's sex equality norm and represents the failure of the Court to recognize the full
normative content of a super-statute. Apart from its procedural limitations on
employees' assertions of Title VII rights, the decision takes an extremely narrow
view of the actions that constitute violations of the statute's mandate of sex
equality.

17. William N. Eskridge, Jr., America ' Statutory "constitution," 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 6
(2007).
18. Id. at 31 32 (noting the Court's lack of staff, dependence on other branches of government
for enforcement of its rulings, and the need to use its "scarce political capital ... cautiously").
19. See id.at 36.
20. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216 (2001).
21. Id. at 1216 17.
22. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 17, at36.
23. See supranote 18 and accompanying text.
24. See Eskridge, Jr., supra note 17, at 36 39.
25. Id. at 29.
26. Id. at 22.
27. Id. at 30.
28. Id. at 22 23.
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B. Ledbetter's ConstrictedView ofIntentionalDiscrimination:Narrowingthe
Scope of the AntidiscriminationPrinciple
In a recent article, Professor Tristin Green discusses what she calls the "insular
individualism" at the root of the Court's opinion in Ledbetter and the implications
it has for Title VII disparate treatment law.29 According to Professor Green, these
implications include the potential limitations on relevant evidence for proving
discrimination and the threat of further intrusions into the requirement of vicarious
liability, particularly, the lure of the so-called "cat's paw" approach to employer
liability."0 I agree with Professor Green that Ledbetter reflects an overly narrow
view of what counts as discrimination. The Court's opinion limits intentional
discrimination to instances of an individual bad actor who consciously and
demonstrably acts upon an invidious sex-based motive toward the plaintiff.' Rather
than focus on the implications for further doctrinal developments that stem from
this conception of discrimination under Title VII, this discussion focuses on the
effects this narrow approach to intentional discrimination has on broader norms of
sex equality in our constitutional culture.
Unfortunately, Ledbetter does not represent a recent innovation or a sudden
inability by courts to grasp the complexity of workplace discrimination. Rather,
Ledbetter is the continuation, and perhaps escalation, of a trend in discrimination
law ushered in by conservative courts that equate discrimination with the discrete
actions of individuals acting with a conscious group-based animus. Discrimination
law has followed this path for some time now, as evidenced by numerous Title VII
decisions. In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,32 the Court upheld a lower court's
determination that the plaintiff, who had made a Title VII racial discrimination
claim, had disproved the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action, but had nevertheless failed to convince the factfinder
that the real reason for the decision was not simply a personality conflict.33 By
treating a negative reaction to an employee's personality and the intent to
discriminate as mutually exclusive, the Court implicitly equated intentional
discrimination with conscious racial animus. The Court's companion cases that set
forth a framework for determining employer liability for sexual harassment,
BurlingtonIndustries,Inc. v. Ellerth4 and Faragherv. City ofBoca Raton, 5 further
continued this trend toward a constrained approach to discrimination law. By
adopting a framework that separates innocent employers from errant individual
harassers,36 the Court implicitly rejected a broader conception of institutional
discrimination in favor of a narrower, individualized approach.

29. Tristin K. Green, InsularIndividualism: Employment DiscriminationLaw After Ledbetter v.
Goodyear, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 353, 354(2008).
30. Id. at 368-72.
31. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2169, 2174 (2007).
32. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
33. Id. at 508, 524-25.
34. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
35. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
36. See Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher,524 U.S. at 807 08. Both cases held that an
employer can assert an affirmative defense to vicarious liability for sexual harassment committed by
one of its employees so long as no tangible employment action, such as "discharge, demotion, or
undesirable reassignment," is taken. Faragher,524 U.S. at 808 (citing Burlington,524 U.S. at 762 63).
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On the constitutional law side, PersonnelAdministrator of Massachusetts v.
Feeney has long been a paragon for those advocating a narrow intent requirement,
holding that a policy that has a discriminatory impact on women does not warrant
serious constitutional scrutiny unless predicated upon a discriminatory purpose,37
which the Court defined as a decision to impose the harmful effects because of its
harm to women, not in spite of such harm.38 In a similar vein, the Court's decision
in UnitedStatesv. Morrison,3 9which found that the Violence Against Women Act4"
was outside of Congress's power to remedy equal protection violations,4 rested on
the Court's view that the states' inadequate responses to violence against women
did not amount to intentional discrimination against women so as to support this
exercise of the Section Five power.42 By implication, "benign" neglect or a lack of
concern for women's situations does not amount to intentional discrimination. Far
from a sharp break from recent precedent, Ledbetter represents more of the same:
a continuation and perhaps acceleration of the direction in which the Court has been
headed rather than a reversal.
In continuing the trend toward equating the law's conception of discrimination
with the narrowest possible understanding of bias and extending it into the pay
setting, Ledbetter is a notable development. In part due to the EPA, pay
discrimination claims have heretofore largely escaped the elusive search for
conscious, intentional bias in making pay decisions.43 Although courts have
consistently limited Title VII pay claims, as opposed to claims brought under the
EPA, to instances of intentional sex-based discrimination, they have often inferred
the employer's intent to discriminate from the existence of pay discrepancies
between women and men who do the same work, at least where the differential
cannot be explained by "a factor other than sex" or other adequate justification.44
The Ledbetter Court, however, takes a much more constrained approach,
defining the trigger of the limitations period as the point in time when the
decisionmaker possessed and acted upon a conscious, intentionally discriminatory
mindset to create a sex-based pay disparity.4" The majority chastised Ledbetter for

37. Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979).
38. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 (quotation marks omitted).
39. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
40. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified in scattered sections of 16, 18 & 42 U.S.C.).
41. Morrison,529 U.S. at 627.
42. Id. at 626 27.
43. See 2 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, MICHAEL J. ZIMMER& REBECCAHANNERWHITE, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND PRACTICE

§ 7.08[B][4], at507 (3d ed. 2002) (citing Corning Glass Works

v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974); Brobst v. Columbus Servs. Int'l, 761 F.2d 148, 157 (3d Cir.
1985)) (explaining that under the EPA, evidence that an employer has paid women less for performing
substantially the same work as males establishes a prima facie case of pay discrimination). An employer
may still
avoid liability by arguing for one of the four authorized defenses, one of which is that the pay
differential was based on some "factor other than sex." Id. at 507 08 (citing CorningGlass, 417 U.S.
at 196); cf Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2187 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that the key difference between pay claims asserted under Title VII and those
asserted under the EPA is that "Title VII requires a showing of intent").
44.
See generally HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATIONLAWAND PRACTICE

§ 7.15, at 481 83 (2d ed. 2004) (describing the plurality ofviews

from the lower courts on the interrelation between Title VII and the EPA, including those courts that
infer a Title VII violation from an EPA violation).
45. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2169.
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failing to allege the existence of discriminatory intent within the charging period,
stating "Ledbetter ... makes no claim that intentionally discriminatory conduct
occurred during the charging period."46 But in fact, Ledbetter did argue that
intentionally discriminatory conduct occurred during the charging period on the
theory that each paycheck that pays a woman less because of her sex is intentional
discrimination under Title VII; because the act of paying Ledbetter less due to her
sex continued into the charging period, the unlawful employment practice
continued as well.47 The Court's refusal to recognize Ledbetter's argument as
alleging intentional discrimination within the charging period reflects the Court's
assumption that discrimination requires an individual decisionmaker to possess and
act upon a conscious sex-based animus.48 In the Court's view, an ongoing pay
disparity that stems from a discriminatory mindset formed and acted upon earlier
amounts only to the lingering effect of prior intentional discrimination and is not
itself a form of ongoing intentional discrimination.4" Importantly, the Court's
refusal to view the continuing pay disparity as intentional discrimination was not
based on the Court's failure to see the plaintiffs sex as the cause of the pay

46. Id.
47. See Brief for the Petitioner at 21-22, Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. 2162 (No. 05-1074), 2006 WL
2610990.
48. In this respect, the Supreme Court adopted the same narrow understanding of discrimination
as the Eleventh Circuit below. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1186
(I lIth Cir. 2005) ("There was no evidence that [the employer] purposefully underrated Ledbetter's
performance for 1997. There was no evidence that [the employer] bore any ill will towards Ledbetter
or toward women generally."); id. at 1187 n.21 ("Ledbetter ... testified that some of the audits upon
which [the employer] would have relied in completing her performance appraisal were purposefully
falsified .... This, however, is relevant only to the accuracy of [the employer's] rankings, not to his
intent. It is not discriminatory to honestly rely on inaccurate information,... and there was no evidence
that [the employer] acted any way but in good-faith reliance on the information he was using.")
(citations omitted). The Court's failure to see the error in this reasoning does not bode well for the socalled "cat's paw" method of determining vicarious liability where a decisionmaker unwittingly takes
an adverse employment action based on the discriminatory recommendation of a subordinate. See
Green, supra note 29, at 368 72 (discussing the implications of the Ledbetter decision on this issue).
49. The Court's summary of Ledbetter's argument is instructive. The majority states the
following:
In an effort to circumvent the need to prove discriminatory intent during the
charging period, Ledbetter relies on the intent associated with other decisions
made by other persons at other times ....
Ledbetter's attempt to take the intent associated with the prior pay decisions
and shift it to the 1998 pay decision is unsound. It would shift intent from one act
(the act that consummates the discriminatory employment practice) to a later act
that was not performed with bias or discriminatory motive. The effect of this shift
would be to impose liability in the absence of the requisite intent.
Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2169 70 (citations omitted). It is clear from this discussion that the "requisite
intent" the Court requires is a conscious sex-based animus held and acted upon by an identifiable
discriminator. See id. at 2174 ("Ledbetter has not adduced evidence that Goodyear initially adopted its
performance-based pay system in order to discriminate on the basis of sex or that it later applied this
system to her within the charging period with any discriminatory animus .... ). Under this view, an
employer that pays a female worker less than similarly situated male workers without a sex-neutral
justification does not necessarily engage in intentional discrimination, unless the motivation for the pay
disparity can be shown to be intentionally discriminatory and linked to the person who makes the pay
decisions.
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disparity. 5' Even though Ledbetter's sex unquestionably played a role in her receipt
of lower pay extending into the charging period,5' the Court limited the
discrimination to the moment in time when the discriminatory mindset coincided
with the decision to pay her less. 52 In effect, the Court separated causation from
intent, limiting discrimination to actions based on conscious animus toward women
rather than a broader inclusion of employment practices that disfavor an employee
because of her sex.5 3 The Court's understanding of pay discrimination effectively
eviscerates Title VII's right to equal pay, because rarely can pay disparities between
similarly situated women and men be traced to a demonstrably conscious sex-based
animus held by an individual decisionmaker5 4
The sex equality norms reflected in Title VII and related statutes encompass the
most robust sex equality norms our laws provide and have been far more significant
in securing meaningful sex equality rights than the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution. When the judiciary limits the scope and reach of these statutes, it
undermines our laws' most important normative commitments to sex equality.
111. LEDBETTER AND THE INCREASINGLY STRICT CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON SEX
EQUALITY STATUTES

The constitutional source for the antidiscrimination super-statutes, at least
insofar as they apply to state and local governments, is Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment.55 In recent years, the Court has insisted on an increasingly
narrowly tailored congruence and proportionality between the statutory prohibitions
and the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment violation targeted. 56 The power to
enact super-statutes thus depends on both the Court's interpretation of what acts of
"discrimination" violate the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the closeness of the
relationship between the remedial measures enacted by Congress and the
underlying Fourteenth Amendment violation.
In recent years, the Court has increasingly limited the scope of Congress's
power to enact valid Section Five legislation. Starting with City of Boerne v.
Flores,57 the Court has required Section Five legislation to be narrowly tailored to

50. See Ledbetter, 127 U.S. at 2169 ("[C]urrent effects alone cannot breathe life into prior,
uncharged discrimination .... ").
51. See id. at 2181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[Ledbetter] charged insidious discrimination
building up slowly but steadily .... Over time, she alleged and proved, the repetition of pay decisions
undervaluing her work gave rise to the current discrimination of which she complained.").
52. Id. at 2169, 2172.
53. See Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2176 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2000)) (noting that the
analysis of a discrimination claim under "the EPA and Title VII are not the same," as "the EPA does
not require ... proof of intentional discrimination").
54. See id.
at2171 ("[1]n a case such as this in which the plaintiff's claim concerns the denial of
raises ....the employer's intent is almost always disputed, and evidence relating to intent may fade
quickly with time.").
55. In order to abrogate a state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity, Congress must ground a statute
on its power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.11, at61 (7th ed. 2004) (citing Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 237 (1985)).
56. See id. § 15.3, at 1101-05 (summarizing the relevant Supreme Court opinions regarding this
issue).
57. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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the constitutional violations targeted. 8 In addition, in determining the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment violation to be remedied, the Court has held that Congress
is bound by the Court's interpretation of what conduct violates that Amendment.59
Consequently, the Ledbetter decision, by narrowing the definition of intentional
discrimination,' ° contributes to a body of law that sets the outer boundaries of the
conduct that Congress may remedy through the use of its Section Five power.
Together, the limits on both the scope of the violations that Congress may remedy
and the means that it may use to remedy these violations have made it increasingly
difficult to secure gender equality through
statutory law, as illustrated by the fate
61
of the Violence Against Women Act.
Ledbetterwill only add to the tension created by simultaneously tightening the
means-ends relationship required and narrowing of the permissible ends of Section
Five legislation. As the meaning of intentional discrimination becomes further
identified with and limited to actions based upon a conscious animus, the scope and
content of permissible statutes for promoting sex equality narrow considerably. The
result is a constitutional collision course in which only the most narrow statutes that
do the least to promote actual sex equality will likely survive. Because any superstatute worth its ink will do more than remedy only that conduct which actually
violates the Equal Protection Clause, such statutes are increasingly vulnerable to
the challenge that they reach beyond Congress's power to secure the equal
protection of the laws.
The Court took a somewhat more cautious and deferential approach in Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs62 than it did in United States v.
Morrison.63 The Hibbs Court carefully described the underlying violation to be
remedied by the Family and Medical Leave Act64 (FMLA) as state leave policies
that denied parental leave to men while granting it more generously to women.65
The Court, therefore, upheld the parental leave provision of the FMLA as a proper
exercise of Congress's Section Five power.66 However, the fact that the Court had
to contort the gender equality issue at the heart of the FMLA into a problem of
discrimination against men illustrates the narrow confines of the Section Five
power. Because the mere failure to attend to women's needs in the workplace
would not rise to the level of a Feeney-type discriminatory intent67 so as to establish
intentional discrimination in violation ofthe Equal Protection Clause, the Court was
obliged to identify the constitutional violation as one involving the facially

58. See, e.g., id. at 533 (finding that the legislation at issue was a proper exercise of Congress's
Section Five power as a proportionate means of remedying unconstitutional state action).
59. Id.at 519.
60. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2172 (2007).
61. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (striking down Congress's attempt to
provide a federal remedy for "victims of gender-motivated violence").
62. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
63. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 624-27 (finding that the civil remedy enacted by Congress in the
Violence Against Women Act could not be sustained under its Section Five powers).
64. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 2654 (2000).
65. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 731.
66. Id. at 735.
67. See Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
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disadvantageous treatment of men.68 Where such contortions are not plausible,
statutes addressing gender inequality are constitutionally vulnerable.
Although I do not foresee the imminent invalidation of our major federal sex
equality statutes, the tightening of the test for passing Section Five legislation
coupled with the shrinking category of what counts as intentional discrimination
creates a real tension in constitutional law that is hostile to broad sex equality
statutes. Unless one of these trends is halted or, better yet, reversed, the scope of
valid antidiscrimination statutes will continue to narrow. So far, courts have
rebuffed the most ambitious efforts to undo the major super-statutes in this area.
Nevertheless, the fact that state defendants are bringing such challenges reveals the
extent to which these converging doctrinal trends create opportunities for
unraveling the statutory landscape for promoting sex equality. Perhaps even more
importantly, the increasing viability of Section Five challenges to federal
antidiscrimination statutes demonstrates the potential to limit the capacity of
Congress to take broader and more sweeping measures in the future.
In recent years, state defendants have urged courts to invalidate a wide variety
of antidiscrimination statutes, using arguments that were unthinkable even a short
time ago. For example, state defendants have challenged the Section Five basis for
Congress's prohibition on retaliation for challenging perceived discrimination
under a number of antidiscrimination statutes on the grounds that such protection
extends beyond conduct that amounts to unlawful discrimination under these
statutes. 6 9 The extension of Title VII to cover disparate impact discrimination,
which goes beyond the Equal Protection Clause's ban on intentional discrimination,
has also been challenged.7 °
Even the EPA has been the subject of Section Five challenges albeit without
success-on the ground that the Act permits a finding of liability based on proof
that men and women are paid differently for substantially the same work,
unexplainable by "a factor other than sex," without additional proof of the
employer's intent to discriminate. While these challenges have failed to persuade

68. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 731-35.
69. See, e.g., Crumpacker v. Kan. Dep't of Human Res., 338 F.3d 1163, 1172 (10th Cir. 2003)
(rejecting a defendant's challenge to Congress's Section Five authority to enact Title Vii's
antiretaliation provision, which protects employees who challenge not just practices that actually violate
Title VII but also practices which the employee reasonably believes violate Title VII); Warren v.
Prejean, 301 F.3d 893, 899 (8th Cir. 2002) (rejecting a challenge to Congress's Section Five authority
to abrogate state immunity under Title Vii's antiretaliation provision); Malone v. Shenandoah County
Dep't ofSoc. Servs., No. 5:04CVOOI 4,2005 WE 1902857, at *5 (W.D. Va. 2005) (rejecting a challenge
to Congress's Section Five authority to enact the antiretaliation provision of the FMLA); Lewis v.
Smith, 255 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1064 66 (D. Ariz. 2003) (rejecting a challenge to Congress's SectionFive
authority to enforce the antiretaliation provisions of both Title VII and the EPA); Nelson v. Kansas, 220
F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1220-22 (D. Kan. 2002) (rejecting a challenge to the validity of Title Vii's
atiretaliation provision).
70. See Okruhlik v. Univ. of Ark. ex rel. May, 255 F.3d 615, 627 (8th Cir. 2001) (rejecting a
defendant's challenge to Congress's Section Five authority to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity regarding both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims brought under Title VII).
71. See Cherry v. Univ. ofWis. Sys. Bd. of Regents, 265 F.3d 541, 553 (7th Cir. 2001); SilerKhodr v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. San Antonio, 261 F.3d 542, 551 (5th Cir. 2001); Vamer v. Ill.
State Univ., 226 F.3d 927, 936 (7th Cir. 2000); Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d 806, 819-21
(6th Cir. 2000); Hundertmark v. State of Fla. Dep't of Transp., 205 F.3d 1272, 1277 (1 lIth Cir. 2000)
(per curiamn); O'Sullivan v. Minnesota, 191 F.3d 965, 967 68 (8th Cir. 1999); Anderson v. State Univ.
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court majorities that the EPA falls outside of Congress's power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment, they have won over dissenting judges who have opined
that the Act does indeed reach too far beyond intentional discrimination to come
within the Section Five power.72 Relying on the Supreme Court's increasingly strict
approach to Section Five legislation described above, the dissenters have argued
that the EPA exceeds the scope of a proper remedy for an equal protection violation
because the Act requires only proof of a sex-based disparity in pay and not a
discriminatory motive behind it. 74 Unfortunately, Ledbetter's insistence on
requiring proof of discriminatory intent over and above the existence of a sex-based
disparity in pay lends credence to this reasoning, which, not long ago, might have
been dismissed as the wishful musings of federal judges hostile to federal civil
rights statutes.
Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has suggested an opening for attacking the
validity of the EPA under the Section Five power. In light of its decision in Kimel
v. Florida Board of Regents, 7 which invalidates the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act76 as inappropriate Section Five legislation,77 the Court remanded
for reconsideration two lower court decisions that had upheld the EPA under the
Section Five power.78 Although the lower courts on remand again upheld the EPA
as valid Section Five legislation,79 the Court's actions in remanding the cases may
signal its own belief that the EPA is vulnerable to challenge under its recent Section
Five caselaw. Furthermore, the Court's reasoning in Ledbetter, sharply
distinguishing the EPA from Title VII, on the ground that the former does not
require proof of discriminatory intent,"0 combined with the Ledbetter decision's
approach equating discriminatory intent with the decisionmaker's conscious
animus, 8 also suggests that the EPA is still vulnerable to attack.
Perhaps the most troubling implication of these doctrinal tensions, as they are
unfolding in the lower courts, is the reasoning courts have used to uphold the EPA:
their reasoning suggests that the Act marks the outer limits of the Section Five

of N.Y., 169 F.3d 117,120-21 (2d Cir. 1999), vacated,528 U.S. 1111 (2000); Mehus v. Emporia State
Univ., 295 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1270 (D. Kan. 2004); Kusjanovic v. Oregon ex rel. Portland State Univ.,
243 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1139 (D. Or. 2002).
72. See Siler-Khodr v. Univ. ofTex. Health Sci. Ctr. San Antonio, 261 F.3d 542 (5th Cir. 2001),
reh 'g en banc denied, 292 F.3d 221, 222 (2002) (Smith, J., joined by Demoss, J., dissenting).
73. See supratext accompanying notes 57 61.
74. Siler-Khodr, 292 F.3d at 224 25 ("Unfortunately, the EPA goes far beyond forbidding
intentional sex discrimination .... Moreover, even where sex was the determining factor in a particular
decision, i
n ot have been the result of'a... course of action [adopted] at least in part because of,
not merely in spite of, its adverse effects on' women.") (quoting Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
75. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
76. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
77. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91.
78. Anderson v. State Univ. of N.Y., 169 F.3d 117, 120 21 (2d Cir. 1999), vacated, 528 U.S.
1111 (2000), remanded to 107 F. Supp. 2d 158 (N.D.N.Y. 2000); Varner v. 111.State Univ., 150 F.3d
706, 717 (7th Cir. 1998), vacated, 528 U.S. 1110 (2000), remanded to 226 F.3d 927 (7th Cir. 2000).
79. Varner, 226 F.3d at 936; Anderson, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 165.
80. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2176 (2007) ("[T]he EPA and
Title VII are not the same. In particular, the EPA does not require . . . proof of intentional
discrimination.").
81. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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power and that Congress cannot go any farther to remedy the wage gap between
women and men. In upholding the EPA against Section Five challenges, courts
have emphasized that the Act is a valid exercise of the Section Five power because
it limits its reach to intentional wage discrimination that would violate the Equal
Protection Clause. 82For example, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that "[i]n passing
the Equal Pay Act, Congress did not prohibit all wage practices that result in a
disparate impact upon the sexes, nor did it provide for liability upon a mere
showing of unequal pay."83 Although the Act shifts the burden of proof to the
employer to justify the pay disparity once the plaintiff has established its prima
facie case of discrimination," 4 the Seventh Circuit explained that this provision did
not exceed Congress's Section Five power because the Act provides "a broad
exemption from liability . . .for any employer who can provide a neutral
explanation for a disparity in pay, . . .effectively target[ing] employers who
intentionally discriminate against women."" This reasoning suggests that the
provision in the Act for the defense that the disparity must stem from "a factor other
than sex" is not only a policy determination about the proper scope of liability but
also a constitutionally necessary limit in order for the Act to fall within the Section
Five power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
This reasoning does not bode well for efforts to extend the reach of pay equity
laws to address gender wage disparities that result from labor market segregation,
different approaches to salary negotiation, reliance on prior salary in setting wages,
or other sex-linked disparities that might be proven to be "a factor other than sex,"
especially if that phrase excludes all but intentionally motivated sex-based
differentials. Women's groups have argued that such changes are needed to
strengthen pay equity laws and significantly shrink the wage gap between women
and men.86 Responding to such arguments, members of the House of

82. Cherry v. Univ. ofWis. Sys. Bd. of Regents, 265 F.3d 541, 551, 553 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing
Varner, 226 F.3d at 932, 934) (agreeing with its previous ruling in Varner, which had emphasized that
the EPA was a proper exercise of Congress's Section Five power because it permits the employer to
defend itsactions by offering any reason for the pay differential "other than sex," thus reaching only
intentional discrimination); Varner, 226 F.3d at 933 34 (emphasizing that the EPA targets intentional
discrimination and emphasizing the "factor other than sex" defense (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv)
(2000))); Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d 806, 819-20 (6th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the
target of the EPA is intentional wage discrimination so that "the standard for liability under the EPA
closely approximates the equal protection analysis for state-sponsored gender discrimination");
Hundertmark v. State of Fla. Dep't of Transp., 205 F.3d 1272, 1276 (1 1th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)
("Under the Act, liability for wage discrimination is only actionable if an employer cannot provide any
factor other than gender to justify the wage disparity."); Mehus v. Emporia State Univ., 295 F. Supp.
2d 1258, 1268 70 (D. Kan. 2004) (adopting the reasoning of other circuits that the EPA targets
intentional discrimination based on gender); Anderson, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 161 ("[L]egislation
prohibiting intentional gender-based wage discrimination is proper legislation under [Section
Five] ....
");see also O'Sullivan v. Minnesota, 191 F.3d 965, 967-68 (8th Cir. 1999) (using broader
reasoning to uphold the EPA as remedial legislation and stating that "[e]ven though the EPA does not
require an employee to show purposeful discrimination to recover, the Act is remedial rather than
substantive legislation").
83. Varner, 226 F.3d at 933 (citations omitted).
84. See id. at 934.
85. Id. at 934.
86. CongressMust Act to Close the Wage Gapfor Women (Nat'l Women's Law Ctr., Washington,
D.C.), Apr. 2007, at 1, available at http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/2007 /20Paycheck /20Fairness
%20Act.pdf, The Paycheck FairnessAct: Helping to Close the Women's Wage Gap (Nat'l Women's
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Representatives introduced the Paycheck Fairness Act87 and the Fair Pay Act of
2007,88 two bills which would expand the scope of the EPA to require equal pay for
equivalent work and replace the "factor other than sex" defense with a much
narrower defense: the employer may only justify pay differentials on the basis of
a factor related to job performance, such as qualifications, experience, or
education.89 There is support for the idea that such changes are indeed necessary to
fully integrate women into the workplace on equal terms with men, in fulfillment
of our Constitution's promise of equal citizenship. 9 Unfortunately, the increasing
stringency of the constitutional limits on Congress's ability to legislate in this area
may take this judgment away from Congress, at least in its ability to pass laws that
are enforceable against state and local governments, which requires Congress's
exercise of its Section Five power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Finally, the shrinking space for sex equality legislation under the Section Five
power already has led some lower courts to invalidate one provision ofthe FMLA,0'
a law passed largely in response to the conflicts women disproportionately suffer
in balancing work with family caretaking responsibilities. 92 Although the Supreme
Court in Hibbs upheld the provision of the FMLA regarding leave to care for a
family member,93 it did not reach the Act's application to leave taken because of an
employee's own serious illness or medical condition. Responding to the doctrinal
shifts described above, which tightened the test for Section Five legislation and
narrowly defined the category of acts constituting intentional discrimination, some
courts have ruled that the self-care leave provision of the FMLA falls outside the
scope of permissible Section Five legislation. 94
These decisions regard the self-care provision as outside the scope of any
legitimate remedy for an equal protection violation because both men and women
become ill and would benefit from leave, and because Congress did not present

Law Ctr., Washington, D.C.), Feb. 2002, at 1, availableat http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/PayCheckFaimess
Feb2002.pdf
87. H.R. 1338, 110th Cong. (2007).
88. H.R. 2019, 110th Cong. ( 2 007).
89. H.R. 1338 § 3(a); H.R. 2019 § 3(a).
90. See, e.g., H.R. 1338 § 2(3)(I) ("[I]n many instances, [the lower pay of similarly situated
women] may deprive [them] of equal protection on the basis of sex in violation of the [Fifth] and
[Fourteenth] [A]mendments."); H.R. 2019 § 2(4)-(6) (noting that women are often paid less than men
for the same work).
91. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 2654 (2000).
92. Id. § 260 1(a)(5), (b)(1) (noting that the primary caretaking responsibilities "often fall [] on
women" and that there is a need to "balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families").
93. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737 (2003) (citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 2612(a)(1)(C)).
94. Some of these rulings were issued prior to the Hibbs decision in 2003. See Chittister v. Dep't
of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 226 F.3d 223, 228-29 (3rd Cir. 2000); Kilvitis v. County of Luzerne, 52 F.
Supp. 2d 403, 410-411 (M.D. Pa. 1999); Driesse v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1334
(M.D. Fla. 1998). However, many courts have struck down the FMLA's self-care provision since Hibbs
was decided. See Toeller v. Wis. Dep't of Corr., 461 F.3d 871, 879 80 (7th Cir. 2006); Touvell v. Ohio
Dep't of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 422 F.3d 392, 405 (6th Cir. 2005);
Brockman v. Wyo. Dep't of Family Servs., 342 F.3d 1159, 1164-65 (10th Cir. 2003); Wampler v. Pa.
Dep't of Labor & Indus., 508 F. Supp. 2d 416, 421 22 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
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evidence that states denied women medical leave more often than they did men.9"
This reasoning, however, fails to acknowledge the reality that, without the FMLA,
pregnant women would only have the right to sick leave equal to that of men under
the PDA. Under the PDA, employers who do not accommodate sickness in male
employees need not do so for pregnant workers either.96 Feminist scholars have
often criticized this approach as allowing employers to treat pregnant women in the
same manner, and as badly, as other temporarily disabled workers. 97 The FMLA
responds with an equal treatment strategy that does not single out pregnancy for
special treatment, which would ultimately penalize and stigmatize women workers,
but rather broadens protections for all workers with medical conditions that impair
their ability to work. 98
In failing to recognize the FMLA's self-care leave provision as a proper vehicle
for securing equality for women in the workplace, courts have effectively rejected
an equal treatment approach that folds accommodations for pregnancy into broader
accommodations for all workers in need of a medical leave. 99 Under the Court's
precedents, the failure to ensure pregnant women the right to return to their jobs
after a necessary medical leave does not amount to intentional discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause; as a result, the FMLA's self-care leave
provision may well become the next casualty of the Court's Section Five doctrine.

95. See, e.g., Toeller, 461 F.3d at 879 (finding no reason, other than pregnancy, why women
would be more likely than men to need short term medical leave); Touvell, 422 F.3d at 402 ("[T]here
is virtually no evidence that those stereotypes [regarding women's role as caregivers] also concern the
behavior of men and women regarding personal medical leave."); Wampler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 421
(finding that nothing in the FMLA suggested that sex-based classification should "affect[] the
administration of leave for self-care").
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k); Touvell, 422 F.3d at 403-04 ("[T]he PDA did not meet one
arguable social need because it did not require the provision of pregnancy-related leave by employers
who offer no benefit provisions at all." (citing Laro v. New Hampshire, 259 F.3d 1, 14 15 (1st Cir.
2001))); Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Employers can treat
pregnant women as badly as they treat similarly affected but nonpregnant employees .... ").
97. See, e.g., RuthColker, Pregnancy,Parenting,and Capitalism,58 OHIO ST. L.J. 61,77 (1997)
("The PDA... imposes no duty to accommodate pregnant women if the employer does not have a
policy of accommodating other workers with health or family-related problems."); Judith G. Greenberg,
The Pregnancy DiscriminationAct: Legitimating Discrimination Against Pregnant Women in the
Workforce, 50 ME. L. REV. 225, 240 (1998) ("If the [PDA] protects women who are pregnant against
any form of discrimination, one would expect it to protect women who are on pregnancy leave from
being fired merely because they are on leave. Yet, it does not do this."); Jessica Carvey Manners,
Comment, The Search for Mr. Troupe: The Need to Eliminate Comparison Groups in Pregnancy
DiscriminationAct Cases, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 209, 222 (2005) ("By comparing pregnant employees with
nonpregnant employees, employers have little incentive to provide any accommodations to pregnant
employees requesting light-duty or modified assignments.").
98. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(4) (noting that one of the purposes of the FMLA is to ensure
"generally that leave is available for eligible medical ... and for compelling family reasons, on a
gender-neutral basis"). Professor Wendy Williams's classic article advocating an equal treatment
approach to pregnancy makes a strong case for the benefits of just such an approach. Wendy W.
Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, andFeminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS.
L. REP. 175, 196-97 (1982).
99. See, e.g., Touvell, 422 F.3d at 403 04 (rejecting the argument that the FMLA was a response
to discrimination against pregnant women because the legislative history of the Act suggests that
Congress was no more concerned with "providing leave benefits to pregnant women than with
providing benefits for other seriously ill men and women").

2008]

THE IMPLICATIONS OF LEDBETTER FOR SEX EQUALITY LAW

671

Ledbetter's narrow view of what conduct counts as intentional discrimination adds
to the pressures that make such statutes vulnerable.
Although most Section Five challenges to major sex equality statutes have so
far been rebuffed in the courts, °° the sheer number of these challenges and the
reasoning courts use to decide them demonstrate that more trouble likely lies ahead.
As the definition of intentional discrimination becomes increasingly narrow and the
required relationship for remedial legislation becomes increasingly tight, there is
less room for Congress to act to promote gender equality through statutory law. If
these trends continue, some of our sex equality super-statutes may find themselves
on shaky constitutional foundations. Perhaps the more likely result is that these
constitutional limits will constrain future congressional action that seeks to address
conduct beyond that which the Court has defined as intentional discrimination.
Against this background, Ledbetter is an unhappy development that only furthers
this trajectory.
IV. LEDBETTER AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE: HOW THE NARROWING
OF "DISCRIMINATION" LEGITIMATES
KNOWLEDGE OF DISCRIMINATION

THE

STATUS

Quo AND THWARTS

I have elsewhere discussed findings from social psychology documenting the
barriers to perceiving discrimination, especially when it takes more subtle forms.'0 '
The reality of people's perception of discrimination contrasts sharply with the
Ledbetter Court's underlying assumption that employees know, or should know, at
a fixed point in time whether they have actually experienced discrimination. In fact,
knowledge of discrimination is a highly relational process, dependent on social
comparisons and beliefs about entitlement.0 2 In this fluid process, the law's
knowledge-producing function plays a role in how and whether people perceive
0 3
discrimination.1
When the message from discrimination law promotes an understanding that
equates discrimination with conscious, observable animus, law participates in
suppressing knowledge of discrimination, especially when that term is more
broadly understood to capture more subtle forms of bias. 104 As Professor Reva
Siegel has explained, "[L]aw exerts authority as a system of meanings."'0 5
Constitutional culture, statutory norms, and public understanding and expectations
are all highly interrelated. Although the precise boundaries and interrelationship of
law and society are not
easy to articulate, "[t]hrough pathways of meaning, law can
06
structure social life.'
By conceptualizing discrimination as only the most obvious, conscious, and
deliberate form of animus against women undertaken by individually identifiable

100. See supra notes 69 81 and accompanying text.
101. See Deborah L. Brake, PerceivingSubtle Sexism: Mappingthe Social-PsychologicalForces
and Legal Narratives that Obscure Gender Bias, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 679 (2007).
102. Id.at 693-97.
103. Id. at 711 12.
104. Id. at 714.
105. Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitutionfrom a Social Movement
Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 317 (2001).
106. Id.
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"bad actors," Ledbetter contributes to the message that discrimination, as we know
it, is largely behind us. The inculcation of this message sets the stage for
characterizing people who attribute inequality to gender bias as overly sensitive and
unreliable. Through this process in which law influences our understanding of what
constitutes discrimination, pay inequality that is not directly traceable to a
conscious discriminatory animus is legitimized, defined by its separation from the
category of intentional discrimination. Without an identifiable and demonstrably
animus-driven bad actor, discrimination is likely to go unrecognized and
unchallenged.
Of course, in this process of the construction of knowledge there is room to
contest judicially-imposed meanings and develop a contrary, more sophisticated
understanding of what discrimination means. The immediate and overwhelmingly
negative reaction to the Ledbetter decision thus far suggests that just such an
opportunity is upon us.'0 7 So far, however, the reaction to Ledbetter has primarily
focused on the practical realities of claiming pay discrimination under the regime
created by the Court.'1 8 While these are important issues, we should not lose sight
of the Court's latest volley in the pitch to continually limit the scope and meaning
of sex discrimination. The popular understanding of sex equality norms need not
be passively received and internalized from the judicial interpretation of what
actions constitute discrimination.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Court's recent Ledbetterdecision is much more than a narrow, procedural
ruling interpreting Title VII's filing deadlines. It is the product of a Court that has
taken an increasingly narrow view of the proper role of law in remedying gender
inequality. At its core, the decision equates unlawful discrimination with the actions
of an individual decisionmaker, actions based on a conscious animus directed
against women. Such a narrow view of sex discrimination leaves little role for law
in promoting gender equality, either through the Constitution's Equal Protection
Clause or antidiscrimination statutes. The Court's current path will leave far less
room to use the law to promote a gender equality agenda, unless perhaps the Court
becomes engaged in a dialogue with other branches of government, scholars, and
the public about the meaning of discrimination.

107. See Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failureof Title 1as a Rights-Claiming
System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 933 (2008) (summarizing the overwhelmingly negative reaction to the
Ledbetter decision in the immediate aftermath of the Court's ruling).
108. See, e.g., id. at 871-78 (criticizing the Ledbetter decision and Title VII's broader rightsclaiming framework because of the realities of employees' perceptions of and responses to
discrimination).

